(DOWNLOAD) "Matter Charlotte Ii." by Supreme Court of New York ~ eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Matter Charlotte Ii.
- Author : Supreme Court of New York
- Release Date : January 08, 1983
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 54 KB
Description
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Clinton County (Feinberg, J.), entered July 22, 1981, which adjudicated Charlotte II. to be a permanently neglected child and terminated respondents parental rights. Respondent mother contends that the evidence in the record does not support the trial courts finding of permanent neglect. We note initially that although this matter was tried and decided before the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Santosky v Kramer (455 U.S. 745), the trial court found the evidence sufficient not only under the fair preponderance standard prescribed by statute (Family Ct Act, § 622), but also under the more rigorous clear and convincing evidence standard mandated by Santosky v Kramer (supra). We agree. There is overwhelming proof that respondent failed to plan for the future of her child, although physically and financially able to do so (Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 7, pars [a], [c]). Respondent was required to formulate and to act to accomplish a feasible and realistic plan (Matter of Orlando F., 40 N.Y.2d 103, 110-111). While the adequacy of a parents plan should not be determined by reference to unrealistically high standards (Matter of Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 125), there must be some attempt to formulate and act upon a practical plan for the childs future, including a method for coping with the problems created by the childs prolonged separation from respondent and the strong psychological ties that the child has formed with her foster parents (Matter of John AA, 89 A.D.2d 738, 740, mot for lv to app den 58 N.Y.2d 605). Respondent made no such plan. For example, after a prolonged period of separation during which respondents contacts with her child were limited to occasional cards, letters, telephone calls and infrequent visits, respondent was unable, despite advice and encouragement from petitioner, to cope with, or even to recognize, the problems created by the absence of a true parent-child relationship between respondent and her child. Accordingly, the visits were often stressful for the child and petitioner was required to place certain restrictions on the visits to protect the child. In addition, during the period of time covered by the trial testimony, respondent made numerous and frequent changes of residence, evidencing her inability to establish a stable home (see Matter of Candie Lee W., 91 A.D.2d 1106, 1108). It is clear from the record that respondent was unable to project a future course of action for herself and made no viable effort to plan for her childs future. Turning next to the question of petitioners diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship (Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 7, par [a]), we find [98 A.D.2d 859 Page 860]